often noted that the right to privacy is fundamental.' In recent years, protection of privacy has come to be viewed as "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment." 6 Since its 1967 decision in Katz v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court has maintained that an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment whenever he or she has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." ' Yet today the Court and scholars alike acknowledge that the constitutional law of search and seizure as it operates to protect privacy is in disarray. 9 Some lower courts, extrapolating from undeveloped intimations from the Supreme Court, have suggested the existence of a new, undefined exception to the usual Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, one that refuses full Fourth Amendment protection to privacy interests perceived as lesser, trivial, or unimportant.' 0 Use of this "lesser expectation of privacy" analysis has led to disparate and conflicting judicial decisions" and subtle manipulation of privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment.
This Note contends that reliance on a concept of reasonable expectations to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment's privacy protection confuses analysis and should be abandoned. Furthermore, the Note argues that a warrant requirement exception based on the perceived "lesser" status of certain privacy interests represents a significant departure from traditional Fourth Amendment principles, and is unworkable and unjustifriendship and trust "inconceivable" without privacy); Gavison, supra at 450 (privacy "crucial" to human relationships). Finally, privacy has been identified as a necessary element of any free and tolerant democratic state. See E. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 22-24 (1956) (privacy vital to "liberal democracy"); Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII, supra, at 79, 86-87 (privacy necessary for "freedom" and "open society"). See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 23-51 ("Privacy in the Modern Democratic State").
5. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (privacy is "[a] most fundamental human right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (same); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (same); cf Privacy Act of 1974 , Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896 , 1896 (currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976)) ("Congress finds that . . . the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States".) 6. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ; accord Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. . . is at the core of the Fourth Amendment . . ."
7. 389 U. S. 347 (1967 837 (1979) (Supreme Court "has neglected to delineate a workable substantive definition of the scope of fourth amendment protections"); Survey, The Fourth Amendment and the Sixth Circuit: A Survey of Search and Seizure Decisions, 12 TOL. L. REV. 511, 547 (1981) (current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is "ad hoc and inconsistent body of case law distinguished only by its essential lawlessness").
10. See pp. 322-26 infra (discussing development of lesser expectation of privacy exception).
11. See notes 104-105 infra (listing cases in which lower courts have reached opposite conclusions when applying lesser expectation of privacy analysis to container searches). Privacy fiable. After suggesting "secrecy and solitude" as the starting point for an inclusive yet objective and sociologically accurate definition of privacy, the Note proposes that any government action that violates an individual's privacy interests should be subjected to full Fourth Amendment protection based on well-developed principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Applying the suggested analysis to container searches, the Note demonstrates that a "closed, opaque container" rule is appropriate, and recommends reappraisal of recent holdings that have been reached under the expectation of privacy approach.
I. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy
Fourth Amendment analysis has traditionally involved two determinations: first, whether a claim falls within the Amendment's scope,'" and second, whether the government has complied with the Amendment's protective requirements." Over time, the Supreme Court has developed a strict warrant requirement as the primary means of ensuring that the Amendment's protective commands are complied with by executive officers. Yet today some courts are acting to forego the warrant requirement in cases in which they determine that only "lesser" privacy interests within the scope of the Fourth Amendment have been violated.
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
Although the Fourth Amendment by its terms protects property, 4 it has long been recognized that the Amendment functions to protect privacy as well. 5 In the landmark decision of Katz v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that privacy interests could be protected under the Fourth Amendment even when no property rights were infringed." Specifically, 12 . Only actions that constitute "searches" or "seizures" are restricted by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9, 15 (1973) (by implication); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
13. The Fourth Amendment governs the conduct only of government agents and not that of private parties. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) .
The only explicit requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures must not be "unreasonable." The Supreme Court has held, however, that two further nontextual Fourth Amendment requirements must be met for most searches and seizures: probable cause, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (noting "true rule" that searches and seizures "made upon probable cause . . . are valid"); accord, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979); see note 30 infra (defining probable cause); and use of prior warrants, see pp. 316-18 infra (describing development and components of warrant requirement).
14. The Amendment guarantees the security of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See note 3 supra (citing authorities); pp. 319-21 infra (discussing protective value of warrants for privacy).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 17. Id. at 352-53. This decision to abandon a purely property-based analysis of Fourth Amendment claims had been foreshadowed in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise the Court ruled that Katz had an interest in the confidentiality of his telephone conversations that was protected against warrantless wiretapping, even though his calls were made from a public phone booth." 8 By protecting this privacy interest, the Court enlarged the Fourth Amendment's protective scope to encompass governmental intrusions in any private context.1 9 Concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan advanced the now-familiar twopart "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as a means of identifying protected Fourth Amendment claims: first, the expectation must be an "actual" one, subjectively held by the person affected by the search; second, the expectation must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "20 Despite its origin in a concurring opinion, this reasonable expectation of privacy formula has emerged as the judicial "lodestar" for current Fourth Amendment analysis."
B. The Warrant Requirement and Protection of Privacy
In the wake of this relatively recent shift to a focus on privacy, some courts have suggested that a strict requirement of prior warrants is unnecessary in Fourth Amendment analysis when the privacy interests at stake are perceived to be small or unimportant. 22 In order to adequately evaluthat property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited. REV. 221, 258-63 (1974). or loss or destruction of evidence, 33 the only cost of the warrant process in theory is the administrative expense of compliance to law enforcement agencies."
The primary value of the warrant requirement lies in its function as a judicial limitation on executive discretion, in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers. 5 Only a neutral judicial officer, detached from "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," is permitted to issue a warrant. 36 The presumption is that a magistrate will refuse the warrant for unreasonable searches that overzealous officers might otherwise have conducted."
33. See p. 322 & note 49 infra (discussing "exigent circumstances" exception to warrant requirement).
34. The Supreme Court has stated that the "burden imposed on the police by a warrant requirement is minimal." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) . No empirical research has been done concerning the costs involved, see note 110 infra, however, and reported cases reveal that the time required to obtain a search warrant upon written affidavit can vary widely. Nevertheless, the "most frequent police objection to the use of search warrants is that the application process is too time-consuming." Israel, supra note 32, at 256. Besides delays in the normal process itself, long distances between law enforcers and magistrates in rural areas, or unavailability of magistrates, may lengthen the application period. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (scarcity of magistrates in southwestern "cow counties" makes warrant requirement burdensome); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1977 Amendment) (noting "administrative difficulties involved in getting a warrant, particularly at times of the day when a judicial officer is ordinarily unavailable").
Since 1977, however, the availability of telephonic warrants has significantly reduced the time burdens involved in seeking warrants, see note 32 supra; cf Miller, supra note 32, at 385-86 (telephone warrant system "operates in a quick and simple manner," and "greatly expanded the total number of search warrants issued" in San Diego). Thus, the Supreme Court has judicially noted the availability of telephonic warrants when stating that "the short time required to obtain a search warrant . . . will seldom hinder [law enforcementi efforts." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981 The particularity requirement of the warrant clause further limits executive discretion by placing specific boundaries on the scope of an intrusive action."' By limiting the objects and parameters of a search, this aspect of the warrant requirement prevents indiscriminate "general" searches of the character that most motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 9 The value of the warrant requirement in protecting privacy is clearest when the process is compared to its likely alternative: after-the-fact judicial review of a search or seizure for "reasonableness. " 4 It is vital to recognize that privacy, once disturbed, cannot be restored in the same way that wrongfully-seized property can be returned if a post-search reviewer finds that "the constable blundered." 4 1 A prior determination of the reasonableness of and probable cause for a search is therefore of critical importance in protecting privacy. Furthermore, prior review avoids the "farequirement, "judicial supervision might yet become effective despite the shortcomings of the past"). 40. Courts may review police actions either in a criminal setting-for example, a suppression hearing or trial-or in a civil action brought by the victim of a suit against the searching officer or officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment creates cause of action for damages if violated). Knowledge that their actions may be subject to such postsearch review may encourage law enforcement officers to act reasonably, and thus provide some measure of protection for privacy interests. Such foreknowledge will provide no privacy protection against intrusive actions taken in good faith, however. (1926) . As a psychological state, privacy may be damaged irreparably by an unwarranted intrusion; an individual may return to a state of privacy after a disruption, but lost privacy cannot be restored. See note 43 infra (discussing psychological implications of privacy invasion). Because property is concrete, it is substantially unaffected by a temporary seizure, and the only irremedial effect is loss of its use during the seizure period. Privacy miliar shortcomings of hindsight judgement" that may, in close cases, lead courts acting after the fact to rule against apparently guilty defendants.
42
The warrant procedure is socially valuable even in cases in which an intrusion on privacy is ultimately permitted. A search by itself is psychologically intrusive, whether or not anything incriminating is actually discovered. 43 By providing notice and assurance to the victim that an impending search has been judicially authorized and delimited, a valid warrant reduces anxiety and the perceived intrusiveness of the action.
44 A postsearch review cannot possibly serve this function. 45
C. The "Lesser Expectation of Privacy" Approach
Despite the protections that a warrant affords, exceptions to the warrant requirement have occasionally been established in order to accomodate other compelling societal needs. 4 . The victim of a police search has no control over the timing, methods, or scope of the search. This absence of control causes anxiety, even if the victim has nothing incriminating to hide. Furthermore, because privacy is necessary to the development of personal autonomy, sense of self-worth, and interpersonal relationships, see note 4 supra, an involutary disruption of privacy by police may be damaging in other ways.
44. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (providing "assurances from a neutral officer" that search is reasonable and judicially authorized, and notice to owner of "scope and objects of the search . . . are important functions for a warrant to perform"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967) (warrant protects householders by informing them that administrative search is required and limited by law, and has been authorized by judicial officer); cf United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (one value served by warrant requirement in context of domestic national security cases is "reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens cannot occur").
45. In addition to providing added protection for privacy, the warrant process avoids excessive resort to the exclusionary penalty of Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1967) (illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in subsequent criminal prosecution), by ensuring that officers do not search or seize unreasonably or without probable cause.
46. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) ("[W] e have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accomodate the identified needs of society.") Established exceptions to the warrant requirement may be roughly divided among three general categories: "consent," "administrative searches" and "exigent circumstances." Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 358-60 (separating exceptions into categories of "consent," "limited . . . routine searches," and "circumstances of haste").
Consent to a search eliminates the need for a warrant, and may be proffered by the party affected ably entail a reduced degree of protection for the privacy interests at stake, however, their bounds are "strictly circumscribed," 47 and "the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." 4 In criminal law, the most common and important exception arises in "exigent" circumstances, situations where contraband or evidence might be lost or destroyed, or persons might be harmed, if officers were to delay in order to seek a warrant. The Supreme Court has refused to create exceptions when a demonstrated need is judged less compelling, however, 0 and has never held that the administrative cost of warrants alone is reason enough to forego their use." Yet the Supreme Court has recently implied that certain expectations of privacy will not be protected by the warrant requirement, even when the traditional exceptions are inapplicable. Administrative searches are those conducted to achieve a valid public purpose in a noncriminal context according to a previously established routine procedure. See, e.g., United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, (1976) (routine warrantless motor vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints justified by the "substantiality of the public interest" in checking "flow of illegal aliens"); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (routine inventory searches of impounded vehicles justified "in response to three distinct needs": protection of police from danger and from false claims of theft, and protection of property left in such vehicles); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (warrantless inspections of gun shops justified as a "crucial part" of "federal efforts to prevent violent crime"). Routine procedures and a noncriminal context are not sufficient justification for an administrative search exception, however; it must also be demonstrated that enforcement of the warrant requirement would frustrate the claimed public purpose or be inappropriate in the context at issue. The Court has thus denied warrant requirement exceptions in some administrative contexts. See, e.g., Privacy of automobiles that took place in the absence of any exigency.1 3 After experimenting with a series of unsatisfactory explanations for this result, 4 the Court in 1974 announced a novel justification: such non-exigent searches are permissible because people hold a "lesser expectation of privacy" in their automobiles than in their homes.'-Despite the unsecure underpinnings of this rationale 56 and the substantial academic criticism that this new "automobile exception" has received, 7 the Court has contin-53. Warrantless automobile searches first received constitutional scrutiny in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . There the Supreme Court, taking judicial notice of the difficulties of Prohibition enforcement, the mobility of automobiles, and their common use in transporting contraband liquor, held that government agents without a warrant could stop and search a vehicle on the highway if they had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband. Id. at 153, 155. This holding was consistent with the rule that exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search, see p. 322 supra, because the automobile was not otherwise subject to police seizure and could have been quickly driven out of the jurisdiction, thereby causing a loss of suspected contraband. Through inexact analysis over the years, however, this holding has been transformed into a generic exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles, regardless of exigency. (asserting "constitutional difference between houses and cars" based on "extensive regulation" of, and "frequency" of police contact with, automobiles); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J. concurring) (suggesting without citation or explanation that warrantless "search of an automobile is far less intrusive . . . than the search of one's person or of a building"); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (mobility of impounded automobile somehow "still obtain[s] at the stationhouse," and that it is "debatable" whether "lesser intrusion" would be continuing impoundment until warrant was obtained, or immediate warrantless search).
55. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle becuase its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.") 56. Cardwell was only a plurality opinion, and Justice Blackmun's reference to the alleged "lesser expectation of privacy" in automobiles was dictum. See id. at 591-92 (upholding warrantless taking of tire tread impressions and paint scrapings from car's exterior on ground that defendant had no expectation of privacy with regard to his car's exterior). Justice Blackmun expressly limited his holding to automobile exteriors, stating that he did not intend "to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 591. Finally, the only support Justice Blackmun offered for the notion of "lesser" privacy in automobiles was Justice Powell' ued to rely on this lesser expectation analysis to uphold non-exigent, warrantless vehicle searches. 5 8 Counterposed to these automobile cases are the more recent decisions in United States v. Chadwick" and Arkansas v. Sanders." These cases hold that warrantless searches of luggage are impermissible in non-exigent circumstances because "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile."" Although the Court has not straightforwardly contrasted the underlying analyses of these luggage and automobile decisions, the holdings appear to indicate that the Court has implicitly identified two points on a hierarchical scale of privacy interests, placing those attributed to automobiles near one end and those associated with luggage nearer the other. 6 2 "Lesser" expectations of privacy are not protected by the warrant requirement, while "greater" expectations are fully protected from warrantless intrusion. Although the Supreme Court has explicitly employed this analysis only in cases involving automobiles, 6 62. For other decisions implying this conclusion, see Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2850 n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (dividing containers into three groups for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis: those "inevitably associated with expectations of privacy;" those that "consistently lack such an association;" and "ambigous" containers "in the middle"); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980) ("securely wrapped" cartons are subject to warrant requirement because owners had no "lesser expectation of privacy than the [owner] of an ordinary locked suitcase"); cf Recent Development, 55 WASH. L. REV. 871, 882 (1980) (speculating that Sanders decision may indicate that "the Court anticipates some gradation of the privacy interest in various containers and packages").
63. But cf Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2592 (1981) (upholding standard of less than probable cause for warrantless detention of persons on premises of house about to be searched pursuant to search warrant, because such seizures constitute "limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (upholding warrantless searches of pretrial detainees based in part on "diminished expectation of privacy" in custodial facilities and in part on special conditions present in criminal detention process).
In Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 Ct. (1981 , the Court exhibited indecision with regard to extending the lesser expectation of privacy analysis to other areas. At issue was the non-exigent, warrantless search of irregularly-shaped packages seized from an automobile luggage compartment and wrapped and taped shut in opaque plastic. A plurality of four Justices held the search unconstitutional, agreeing that all "closed, opaque containers" mainfest constitutionally protected privacy interests and thus apparently rejecting the lesser expectations approach. Id. at 2846. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgement without opinion. Id. at 2847. Concurring, Justice Powell explicitly advocated applying a hierarchical privacy scale. Id. at 2850; see note 62 supra (quoting from Justice Powell's concurring opinion). Finally, three Justices dissented in separate opinions, all apparently rejecting a hierarchical approach and advocating a bright-line rule permitting a warrantless search of any containers discovered in a lawfully seized and searchable automobile. See id. at 2581 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2853 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Lower expectations approach to searches of other objects and areas, with confused and conflicting results.4
The court has offered little explanation for its decision to forego the warrant requirement in non-exigent automobile searches, other than the bald assertion that the privacy interests affected are relatively minors.
6 By failing to identify any countervailing societal needs served by the lesser expectation of privacy exception, the Court has violated the settled Fourth Amendment doctrine that exceptions to the warrant requirement are permitted only to accomodate the "identified needs of society,"' 6 and that the government must bear the burden of proving that an exception is necessary. 65. The Court has hinted that difficulties surrounding seizure and storage of automobiles due to their size might also support an automobile exception. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979) (strict warrant requirement for lawfully seized automobiles might create "severe, even impossible, burdens on many police departments" by making necessary adequate towing equipment, safe storage lots, and extra personnel). But see Comment, supra note 57, at 954 (police departments may in fact have adequate facilities for temporary automobile impoundment while warrants are sought). If the Court intends to rely on the Sanders dictum, however, it has so far failed to say so explicitly, and has rested its distinction between automobiles and luggage solely on supposed privacy differences. See p. 322-24 supra. Moreover, even if such practical difficulties may be held to support a general-automobile exception, the reasoning fails to distinguish luggage from other, smaller containers that lower courts have held excepted from the warrant requirement. See notes 104 & 132 infra (citing cases).
66. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) ; cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (warrant is required whenever "no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search").
67. The lack of demonstrated justification for a lesser expectation of privacy exception to the warrant requirement forces defendants to demonstrate not only that their privacy has been invaded, but also that their interest in that privacy rises to some undefined level of intensity or importance, in order to be fully protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court noted in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979) , that the "proponent of a motion to dismiss has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated," id. at 130-31 n.1, this merely "reaffirmed the established rule" that a defendant must show that "challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) . Thus the government should still have to justify warrantless intrusions on personal privacy. Several respected jurists have noted the implicit break with settled doctrine that an unjustified lesser expectation of privacy exception entails. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip Moreover, the recognition of lesser expectations of privacy cannot be dismissed simply as an implicit holding that certain expectations of privacy are "unreasonable." If this were the case, the Court could simply hold that such expectations fall completely outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and are therefore wholly unprotected. The Court has steadfastly maintained, however, that individuals do retain privacy interests in their automobiles," and continues to judge automobile searches according to the Amendment's reasonableness and probable cause standards. The inescapable conclusion is that the Court is recognizing a new exception to the warrant requirement sub silentio, uniquely grounded not on exigent necessity or other demonstrable societal need, but solely on the perceived insignificance of certain types of privacy interests. 69
II. A Critique of Current Privacy Analysis
The expectation of privacy approach to claims under the Fourth Amendment may be criticized on three general grounds. First, using a concept of "reasonable expectations" to identify privacy confuses analysis and permits manipulation of privacy protection. Second, a single valueordered hierarchy of privacy interests that is fair cannot be developed, and would be unworkable in any case. Finally, a Fourth Amendment analysis that denies warrant protection to those privacy interests labeled "lesser" merely because the warrant process involves some cost to law enforcers is constitutionally impermissible.
Ct. 386 (1981) (panel takes "entirely novel approach" because "[ilnstead of requiring those seeking an exemption from the warrant requirement to show the need for one, the majority would ask the defendant . . . to demonstrate . . . that his personal possessions should be entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tang, J., dissenting) (by presuming that burden is on defendant in paper bag search case, majority "inverts... the correct analytic approach"). The possibility of basing Fourth Amendment protection on a hierarchical conception of privacy has been briefly noted but rejected out of hand in the past. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 386 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for appearing to suggest that automobiles may be warrantlessly searched for "less compelling" reasons than may houses due to a 'diminished' expectation of privacy," and declaring that "[t]his has never been the law"); Weinreb, supra note 24, at 70, 75 ("[ijf one took seriously" Court's decisions regarding non-exigent warrantless automobile searches, they could support "doctrine of degrees of privacy," but "[c]onstitutionally, there are no degrees of privacy").
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Privacy
A. Abandoning Reasonable Expectations in Favor of Privacy Interests
The explicit focus on privacy in Katz represented an important advance in Fourth Amendment analysis. 70 Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy formula has become a manipulable and restrictive analytical tool for identifying privacy concerns that fall within the Amendment's protective scope." A pure concept of privacy interests based upon an objective definition of privacy should instead be the focus of Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Problem with Reasonable Expectations
Initially, the reasonable expectation of privacy test requires an individual to have an "actual expectation" of privacy before he can claim Fourth Amendment protection. 7 2 Expectations of privacy, however, are not necessarily coextensive with privacy per se. Critics have noted that such subjective perceptions can be manipulated by the government; in various Orwellian 73 hypotheticals, persons might not actually expect privacy in circumstances where a normative interest in privacy is clearly identifiable. Conversely, an irrational individual might actually expect privacy in situations where no true privacy claim can be said to exist. 71. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 385 (rejecting "talismanic" application of expectation of privacy analysis, because it does not offer "comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage"); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L. J. 329, 335 (1973) (expectations test is "severe restriction on the scope of fourth amendment protection"); see also note 21 supra (listing critical commentators of reasonable expectation of privacy test); cf Postscriptum, supra note 70, at 498 ("redefinition" of Fourth Amendment privacy analysis may be necessary after Katz, due to "abstractness" of reasonable expectation of privacy test).
72. See p. 316 supra (describing reasonable expectation of privacy formula).
See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949):
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. . . . It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and . . . every movement scrutinized. 74. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (state might eliminate expectations of privacy by making pervasive television announcements that all citizens were "forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance"); Note, supra note 21, at 158 (hypothesizing "well publicized" statute that would require "occupants of automobiles on toll highways to submit to extensive searches of the[irl vehicles, their persons, and their luggage at selected toll booths"). Such hypotheticals do not seem so far-fetched in light of recent decisions holding that certain expectations of privacy may be reduced or eliminated by statute or posted notice. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("[E]xtensive federal and international regulation of shipping and boating significantly limits the privacy that anyone might expect to have on the seas."); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d. 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (posted notice that department store Anticipating the latter possibility, the test also requires that actual expectations be "reasonable" to be protected. In practice, courts often simply presume the existence of an actual expectation and devote their energies to this second inquiry for reasonableness, making the question of actual expectations totally academic." But to define reasonable expectations as those which "society is prepared to accept as reasonable" is obviously tautological, 7 6 and makes the entire analysis essentially standardless." For these reasons, the notion of reasonable expectations of privacy should be abandoned in favor of a pure concept of "privacy interests," in the sense of claims to privacy to which persons are entitled under the Fourth Amendment regardless of individual expectations. 8
Defining Privacy
For all its modern concern with privacy, the Supreme Court still has not arrived at a common, workable definition of privacy." Nevertheless, in fitting rooms were "under surveillance" eliminated any expectation of privacy of occupants).
Four years after Katz, Justice Harlan dissociated himself from an application of his own reasonable expectation of privacy test on this very ground. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations" because "expectations . . . are in large part reflections of laws"). The Supreme Court has more recently noted the possibility of undesirable manipulation of privacy protection under the "expectations" approach, but has advanced no helpful solution. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979) (commenting only that if "individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, .
a normative inquiry would be proper").
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) ("jElven if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' "); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1155 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981) ("We assume that Ramapuram had an actual subjective expectation of privacy".); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (actual expectation of privacy "can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection").
76. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 385 ("[Tlhe basis of the Katz decision seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection. Of course this begs the question.") 77. Numerous critics have noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy test provides "no objective referent" to guide courts or police. Note, supra note 42, at 1474. See, e.g., Walinski & Tucker, supra note 21, at 2 ("no principled way for judges to determine whether a given expectation of privacy" is reasonable); Yackle, supra note 37, at 362 ("[Tlhere is no more amorphous standard in our law than 'reasonableness' . . . . The inquiry is unprincipled.") 78. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (Fourth Amendment rights are not merely subjective expectations; they are rights that "we should demand of government"); Note, supra note 21, at 171 (if "expectations" are to determine Fourth Amendment's scope, then "courts must recognize that the core of the fourth amendment contains a minimum set of expectations to which all persons are entitled").
An "interest" in constitutional law generally is recognized as representing a claim to some right, in the sense of an entitlement, as in "liberty interest," or "property interest." See BLACK'S LAW DIC-TIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "interest" as "the most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something"). A "privacy interest," then, is a claim that one has privacy or is entitled to have privacy in a particular place or situation; such a claim should not be dependent on individual subjective desire.
79. Most of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on privacy have come in abortion or sexual conduct cases, and have been exemplary rather than explanatory. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
order to give the concept of privacy interests meaningful content for protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the law must reach some agreement as to what constitutes privacy." 0 Such a definition should not be left open for individual courts to fill on a case-by-case basis;8 some common, objective definition of privacy must be developed if the concept of "privacy interests" is to be any less manipulable than that of "expectations.
2
The essence of privacy is twofold: the ability to keep personal information unknown to others and to keep one's self separate from interaction with others. These basic concepts, which embody the definitions of privacy proffered by experts in divers fields, can be encapsulated in the phrase "secrecy and solitude. REV. 193, 193, 195 (1890) (discussing right to privacy as the "right to be let alone"). The Court has not further developed a definition of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, however, because since Katz its analysis has focused on reasonable expectations instead of on privacy itself.
80. Cf Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 REV. , 1056 REV. (1978 ("before courts apply any of the standards developed to effectuate the first amendment, they must" develop some definition of religion and religious belief). Some commentators have suggested that privacy may be undefinable. See, e.g., Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977) ; Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn, 1976, at 7, 12 . A workable definition must be attempted, however, as these same commentators have gone on to do, unless privacy analysis under the Fourth Amendment is to be abandoned.
81. The danger of allowing individual courts to decide what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy without giving them objective guidelines is that "[als the judges' own values vary, so does the scope of the Fourth Amendment." Note, supra note 21, at 1474. 82. Furthermore, law enforcement officers cannot be expected to understand and consistently apply Fourth Amendment privacy analysis without some objective guidelines. Cf. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1974) (any definition of privacy should be judged under three criteria: accurate data-fit, simplicity, and "applicability by lawyers and courts").
83. See, e.g., I . ALTMAN, supra note 5, at 20 ("selective control of access to the self or to one's group"); A. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7 (individuals' ability "to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others," and to control their "voluntary and temporary withdrawal" from society); Gavison, supra note 5, at 428 ("secrecy, anonimity, and solitude"); Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 43, at 23 ("management of interaction . . . and information"); Marshal, Privacy and Environment, 1 HUMAN ECOLOGY 93, 93 (1972) ("ability to control the degree to which people and institutions impinge upon one's life"); Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 326 (1975) ("our ability to control who has access to us and to information about us"); Note, supra note 57, at 841 (automobile searches involve intrusions upon "privacy as secrecy"). But ef Shils, supra note 43, at 283 n.1 (secrecy can be distinguished from privacy on ground that concept of privacy allows for voluntary disclosure of information while secrecy does not). All legal defintions of privacy, including that suggested here, owe some debt to Warren & Brandeis' seminal discussion of privacy in the libel context as the "right to be let alone. " See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 79, at 193. ment's right to intrude upon secrecy and solitude respectively." 4 Such a conjunction of the legal and social science concepts of privacy is desirable, and "secrecy and solitude" may therefore be adopted as the starting point for a broad yet more objective constitutional definition of privacy.S With this embryonic definition in mind, courts should view any governmental violation of an individual's control over personal information or interaction with others as an infringement of Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 86 
B. Hierarchical Privacy: Undesirable and Unworkable
Once privacy interests are identified, Fourth Amendment analysis must provide a rubric for applying the protections of the Amendment to those interests in particular circumstances. The hierarchical approach of the lesser expectations of privacy rationale, despite its apparent sophistication, 7 creates a system of Fourth Amendment analysis that is unworkable and discriminatory. Moreover, an exception to the warrant requirement based solely upon warrant costs ignores the constitutional balance struck in the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore unacceptable. 
85.
Defining privacy as secrecy and solitude helps to objectify the concept because the two component interests, personal information and interaction with others, have relatively concrete meanings and are therefore capable of objective definition. Hence these interests will be more immediately and consistently identifiable by large numbers of individuals, including judges, law enforcement officers, and the average citizen. An element of subjectivity undeniably remains in this definition; this is, however, the inherent difficulty in any definitional process, especially one concerning constitutional concepts, and it should not forestall the attempt. See Gerety, supra note 80, at 236 & nn.14-16 (definition of privacy must rest on subjective intuitions at some level, but, as with all intuitions, "if enough people share them . . . we say we know them to be so"); cf. Note, supra note 80, at 1072 (search for constitutional definition of religion is "inherently problematic" due to unavoidable recourse to "inductive reasoning").
86. Infringement of a privacy interest merely triggers further Fourth Amendment analysis, see pp. 337-38, and does not necessarily lead to full Fourth Amendment protections. See pp. 320-21 supra (discussing exceptions to full Fourth Amendment protection); cf p. 315 supra (Fourth Amendment analysis is two-step process).
87. See pp. 322-26 supra (discussing lesser expectation of privacy approach to Fourth Amendment analysis). To the extent that the lesser expectations approach identifies obvious rough distinctions among privacy interests, see p. 332 infra, and permits intermediate levels of Fourth Amendment protection, it may appear more sophisticated than the simple dichotomy between reasonable and unreasonable expectations of privacy. Because results under this approach are unfair, unworkable, and constitutionally impermissible, however, see pp. 331-36 infra, its apparent sophistication is only skindeep.
A New Implicit Balance
Because the exception to the warrant requirement for "lesser" privacy interests is only now emerging, its theoretical foundation can only be surmised. Given that the Supreme Court has failed to assert any compelling societal need as a counterbalance to the privacy interests that are infringed under this approach, 8 it appears that the underlying analysis weighs the bare cost of the warrant process itself against privacy. 89 Apparently, privacy interests judged to be less "valuable" than the cost of a warrant are excepted from the warrant requirement. If warrant costs are in fact being viewed as the implicit counterbalance to "lesser" privacy interests, the analysis represents a significant break with past Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the cost of the warrant process should not affect the Fourth Amendment balance; warrants are "not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against • . .police efficiency." 90
A Privacy Hierarchy-Neither Workable Nor Fair
There are several reasons to believe that a privacy hierarchy that discriminates between privacy interests of "lesser" and "greater" importance or value will be unfair and unworkable in practice. First, privacy is a culturally diverse concept, 9 ' and it is unlikely that a single fair hierarchy of privacy concerns can be developed. Individuals placed in different environments develop varying conceptions of privacy that are compatible with 88. See p. 325 supra (Supreme Court has not identified any counterbalancing need to justify a lesser expectation of privacy exception to warrant requirement). It must not be forgotten that privacy interests are actually identified and held affected in cases that employ the "lesser interest" approach. See p. 326 supra (Supreme Court continues to hold that privacy interests in automobiles are significant).
89. Cf United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (speculating that "the argument [for lesser expectation of privacy exception] appears to be that" some privacy claims "are too small, [or] too insecure . . . to burden the time of a magistrate").
90. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) ; see note 115 infra (citing cases in accord).
91. Professor Altman has argued that the desire and capability to achieve and regulate privacy is a "cultural universal," common to human beings in all settings. Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific? 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 66, 68, 82 (1977) . Accord, A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 13 ("Needs for individual and group privacy and resulting social norms are present in virtually every society.") Although the universality of the human need and desire for privacy is undeniable, specific conceptions of what constitutes a desirable level of privacy and how to achieve it vary both among and within cultures, creating "cultural diversity" for purposes of comparing specific privacy interests. See Altman, supra, at 67-68, 69 ("a person may use different [privacy regulating mechanisms], depending upon circumstances" and "specific behaviors and techniques used to [regulate privacy] may be quite different from culture to culture"); id. at 72-82 (giving examples of different cultural privacy conceptions from areas such as Brazil, Africa, and South Pacific); A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 11-18, 26-30 (giving cross-cultural examples); see generally E. HALL, THE HIDDEN Di-MENSION 123-67 (1966) (discussing different cross-cultural and intra-cultural conceptions of privacy). prevailing conditions. 2 If the manifestations of such diverse privacy conceptions effectively preserve privacy, however, they cannot be said to be objectively wrong, unreasonable, or "less valuable" to their holders." Any attempt to rank claims to privacy in order of their relative importance will therefore vary according to the ranker's conception of privacy, and no unitary scale can be developed without slighting others that may be equally valid. 94 While rough distinctions among privacy interests may possibly be made on a general level (for example, that automobiles are generally held to be less private places than houses), the importance of privacy to different individuals in particular circumstances cannot readily be generalized nor predicted. 95 If the privacy hierarchy preferred by the majority is chosen as the constitutional standard for Fourth Amendment analysis, identifiable privacy interests of nonconforming minorities will in-92. See I. ALTMAN, supra note 4, at 32 ("[Privacy mechanisms can change over time and are responsive to the situation at hand."); Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 43, at 25 (same); Marshall, supra note 83, at 95 (same). Privacy conceptions will be varied rather than absent in conditions that are adverse to secrecy and solitude because privacy is a fundamental human need. See note 4 supra (discussing importance of privacy). Examples of privacy conceptions that differ from those of the majority of Americans are those held by the poor, see, e.g., I. ALTMAN, supra note 4, at 38 (indigent couple achieved privacy from seven children by placing marital bed behind "wall built out of empty crates"); G. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM 78, 91 (1968) (poor have a "homelife that allows for little privacy" yet have street life of a "highly personal and private nature"), and by the mentally ill, see, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 230-37, 246, 251-52 (1961) (residents of mental hospital sought privacy in "underground trench," "partly wooded field," "dark alcove," and beneath blankets on floor, and concealed their personal possessions in jacket pockets, shopping bags, socks, and a "cleanedout tobacco pouch"); Bettelheim, Feral Children and Autistic Children, 64 AM. J. SOC. 455, 458 (1959) (autistic children "build themselves dens in dark corners or closets" by using blankets).
93. Whether privacy is "effectively preserved" in a particular situation will require an objective examination of the circumstances for secrecy or solitude. See pp. 329-30 supra. Although a particular privacy claim or mechanism may seem bizarre to other individuals, it is objectively valid if it has preserved some degree of secrecy or solitude even in a tenuous manner. Cf I. ALTMAN, supra note 4, at 38 (example of bedroom wall made of orange crates).
94. Cf. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59 (2d ed. 1963) ("[Mlethods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences . . . are either imposed or dictatorial."); Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 157 n.48 (1978) (noting "logical impossiblity of there being some such procedure or formula for combining individual preference orderings so as to get determinate and consistent social preference orderings").
95. Thus in a particular situation an individual may value the privacy of his automobile more than that available in his home, and entire classes of people, such as residents of crowded tenements, may value their automobiles far more than their apartments as private places. See Yackle, supra note 37, at 410-411 (1978) (suggesting examples of persons who place high value on the privacy of their motor vehicles: "family that lives in a mobile home or. . . a recreational vehicle," "traveling salesperson," and persons "who live in over-crowded apartments where the television set is always blasting, the phone is always ringing, and the kids are always screaming"). Even if the lesser interests approach permitted individuals with differing privacy hierarchies to demonstrate that their specific privacy interests are "important enough" to receive full Fourth Amendment protection, it would constitute an unexplained shifting of the burden of proof from the government on whom that burden traditionally lies. See note 67 supra (noting implicit burden shift under lesser interests approach). The cost of individualized hearings to determine the status of privacy claims also argues against such an approach. evitably be impinged upon as "lesser," 96 an unfair and undesirable result in a constitutional system that generally respects minority rights.
97
In addition, income level variations among members of society make it likely that an analysis that slights lesser privacy interests will adversely affect the poor. 9 Some commentators have suggested that the precautions taken to preserve privacy should be looked to when evaluating which privacy interests are reasonable or important enough to merit full Fourth Amendment protection. 9 The poor, however, are less able to afford precautions that might serve as such indicators,"' 0 and therefore would be more likely to be subjected to intrusions than would wealthy individuals. Consequently, as Judge Bazelon has noted with regard to container searches, the lesser interests approach "makes the level of constitutional protection available to a citizen dependent on his ability to purchase a fancy repository for his belongings."' 01 A constitutional analysis that sys- 624, 642 (1943) . Cf Note, supra note 80, at 1072 (danger of subjective definition of religion is "that courts will determine what is or is not religion on the basis of their own parochial experience," resulting in "arbitrary exclusion of the unorthodox").
98. This second criticism should be differentiated from the 'criticism that a hierarchical privacy system will discriminate against nonconforming minorities. Not all nonconforming minorities are poor, and the approach discriminates in this second way because the particular minority is poor, not merely because it fails to conform.
99. See Rakas v. Illinois 439 U. S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J. , concurring) (court should examine whether ;ndividual "took normal precautions to maintain his privacy"); Note, supra note 42, at 1480-84 (courts should examine whether means used to secure privacy are "reasonably calculated to acheive that purpose"). Although a "reasonable precautions" focus may sharpen the reasonable expectation of privacy test somewhat, see id. at 1480-81, it obviously does not avoid the subjectivity inherent in any "reasonableness" approach, and may result in a failure to protect privacy in situations where precautions are unavailable to an individual or are seemingly unnecessary. See Note, supra note 21, at 169 (precautions focus offers "no refinement of 'reasonableness ' concept," and 655 F.2d. 1159 655 F.2d. , cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981 . As the en banc majority in Ross noted, an exception to the warrant requirement for containers alleged to have lesser privacy interests "would snare those without the means or the sophistication to use worthy containers. " 655 F.2d at 1170. tematically tends to deprive the poor of a fundamental right such as privacy is not only undesirable, but also constitutionally impermissible." 2 Finally, the infinite variety of circumstances possible in search and seizure cases, combined with the inherent subjectivity of a hierarchical privacy analysis as outlined above, makes a lesser interests approach to Fourth Amendment analysis unworkable. Every case presents a unique set of facts that may be relevant to the determination of the status of a privacy claim, and courts have failed to develop discernible standards by which consistent determinations can be made." 0 3 Consequently, in reviewing various container searches, some courts have found that a knapsack, zippered and unzipped carrying bags, a cardboard box, and a closed paper bag all manifest privacy interests that are insufficient to merit warrant protection." 4 Other courts have come to the opposite conclusion in cases involving virtually identical containers." 0 5 While case-by-case adjudication might eventually produce relatively consistent guidelines in some areas of law, this has never been the case in the Fourth Amendment context.' 6 Such judicial confusion creates even greater difficulties for law enforcement officials, whose conduct is theoretically guided by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.' 7 When confronted with a multitude of potential privacy claims, the officer on the street using the lesser interests approach has little to rely upon besides his own estimation of their importance, which may well differ from that of the suspect, another officer, or later, a judge. " ' Errors will inevitably be made, and a system of law enforcement based on such indefinite and shifting ground is undesirable for citizens as well as unworkable for the police.' 0 9
C. Warrant Costs and the Constitutional Bargain
Even if a fair and workable hierarchy of privacy interests were possible, Fourth Amendment protections for lesser interests should not be reduced to save the cost of a warrant. The public interest in efficient law enforcement is emminently valid. But putting aside the possibility that foregoing the warrant requirement may not be truly cost-effective, " 0 the claim of police efficiency must be analyzed in light of our constitutional history. 107. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 Ct. , 2863 Ct. (1981 (Fourth Amendment doctrine should guide police conduct in "day-to-day activities") (quoting LaFave, supra note 106, at 141); Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 369 (same); Dworkin, supra note 106, at 365 (same).
108. Cf Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 Ct. , 2846 Ct. (1981 TIMES, October 6, 1981, at A30, col. 3 (letter from New York City Deputy Police Commissioner) (current Fourth Amendment rules "cannot be understood" by police due to their "obscurity"); cf Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 Ct. , 2851 Ct. (1981 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).
109. Besides providing no guidance for police, uncertain Fourth Amendment rules lead to increased suppression litigation and consequent exclusion of evidence. Lack of clarity also leaves citizens uncertain and uneasy regarding the extent of their protection under the Constitution. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct., 2860 Ct., , 2864 Ct., (1981 (if rules are unclear "person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority"); Dworkin, supra note 71, at 365 (if rules are unpredictable, "police are encouraged to perform questionable searches and seizures" which, in turn, "results in unnecessary invasions of individual rights and in litigation which could well have been avoided"); LaFave, supra note 106, at 142 (result of uncertain rules "may be the sustaining of motions to suppress" as well as uncertain security for privacy rights).
110. Cost effectiveness of the warrant process has never been empirically examined by courts or commentators, yet it is not an insubstantial issue. Searches conducted pursuant to a validly obtained warrant are more likely to be favorably viewed by courts, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 417, 419 (1969) (magistrate's "determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (noting "preference to be accorded searches under a warrant"), and by juries, see Note, supra note 32, at 692 (warranted searches are "presumptively lawful" and create "favorable impression on bbth court and jury"). Therefore, probative evidence seized under warrant is less likely to be excluded by courts. In addition, resources of the criminal justice system viewed as a whole may well be conserved by an increase in warrant usage, because suppression litigation will become less time-consuming and may even be foregone in cases III. A New Framework for Analysis Three goals of Fourth Amendment privacy analysis emerge from the discussion above: accomodation of a broad diversity of privacy claims, and nondiscriminatory and workable analytical results. In light of the failure of current Fourth Amendment analysis to achieve these goals, a new analytical framework is necessary. Using a definition of privacy such as secrecy and solitude, courts should err on the side of Fourth Amendment protection,"' and should develop inclusive "bright-line" standards to consistently guide law enforcers. Application of this new approach demonstrates that a "closed, opaque container" rule for warrant application in container search cases is appropriate, and that certain case results should be reappraised.
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis
The promise of Katz-expansive protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment-has not been fulfilled under current privacy analysis. ' As a fundamental right, privacy requires strict and broad protection.
Because the importance of privacy interests cannot be fairly or accurately ranked on a relative scale, the scope of the Fourth Amendment should encompass even those interests that seem insubstantial to many members of society." 9 A showing of some compelling societal need may justify reduction in Fourth Amendment protection for such interests on some occasions,120 but the cost of administering the warrant process, without more, should never be held to counterbalance a recognized privacy be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;. . . but the King of England cannot enter . . .the ruined tenement!") 117. Cf. Gavison, supra note 5, at 467-71 (law should make "explicit commitment to privacy" as a "central value").
118. 24-25 (1971) (freedom of expression must be broadly construed, to effect "constitutional policies" of "individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests"); L. TRIBE, AMIERI-CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 579 (1978) (any theory of freedom of speech should "protect a rich variety of expressional modes").
120. See pp. 317, 321-22 (exceptions to Fourth Amendment requirements granted upon showing of "compelling societal need").
interest." 1 Moreover, once a privacy interest has been implicated, the burden of persuasion to justify intrusions should remain on parties opposed to full Fourth Amendment protection,"' and exceptions, if granted, should be narrowly circumscribed in order to provide maximum protection for the interests at stake. In short, all privacy interests should be analyzed equally under the Fourth Amendment, to prevent subtle or unwitting discrimination against minority-held privacy interests.
Under the suggested approach, Fourth Amendment analysis would still proceed in two steps. First, determination of the scope of constitutional protection would focus on identification of secrecy or solitude. Second, protective application would focus on the presence of exigency or other compelling societal interest that might justify reducing Fourth Amendment protections. Any identified privacy interests would be accorded the full protection of the Amendment, including the warrant requirement, unless some counterbalancing justification other than the expense of the warrant itself were demonstrated.
Courts should develop and apply the proposed analysis in a manner that provides comprehensible guidance to police. 2 ' Because privacy is not concrete as is property, and is therefore more difficult to identify in the field, courts should use the suggested analysis to develop "bright-line" standards that can be easily applied by law enforcers.
124 This is not to suggest, however, that any bright line is acceptable. On the contrary, such standards should be consistent with the broad, nondiscriminatory foundation of the proposed analytical framework, and therefore be drawn at the outer bounds of any particular area of application.
2 1 Such standards will 121. See pp. 335-36 supra (warrant costs already included in "constitutional bargain" of the Fourth Amendment); cf Stanley Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency" and Bill of Rights was designed to protect rights from "overbearing concern for efficiency"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("objective of reducing the workload on probate courts . . . is not without some legitimacy," but it does not justify sex discrimination under equal protection clause).
122. See p. 325 & note 67 supra (criticizing implicit burden of proof shift emerging in Fourth Amendment analysis).
123. See note 107 supra (one goal of Fourth Amendment analysis is to guide conduct of law enforcement officers).
124. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 Ct. , 2863 Ct. (1981 (praising Fourth Amendment rules that are "straightforward, . . . easily applied, and predictably enforced," because they enable police to "'reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement' ") (quoting LaFave, supra note 106, at 142); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-14 (1979) 
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Privacy protect privacy and yet provide police with a Fourth Amendment analysis that is workable on a day-to-day basis.
B. Container Searches
Because the expectation of privacy and lesser interests approaches inevitably cause confusion, police searches of containers are currently a source of much Fourth Amendment conflict." 6 Container searches therefore provide a useful backdrop for application of the privacy analysis proposed above. A "container" is anything that can enclose another object; it might be an automobile trunk, a suitcase, or a paper bag.' Police typically seize such containers in the course of an arrest, upon suspicion that they contain contraband or criminal evidence. 2 Because such containers, once lawfully seized, are in the "exclusive control" of the police, delaying a search of the containers to seek a warrant presents no risk of loss or destruction of the contents. 2 9 How should the non-exigent search of such containers be dealt with under the Fourth Amendment?
A container that successfully prevents outside identification of its contents preserves privacy in the sense of secrecy, and therefore should fall In virtually all such cases, if officers have probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband, they also have probable cause to arrest its possessor. See 2 RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFES-SIONS § 23.3(a), at 23-9 through 23-15 (2d ed. 1980) (probable cause for arrest in contraband cases is established not only by sight of contraband, but also by smell, sight of common contraband containers, suspicious behavior, informants' tips, and other "special rules"). Thus it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the person holding a container that may be validly seized and searched could not also be detained validly until a warrant for the container search was obtained. But see United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d. 1159, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (when automobile is stopped on probable cause that it contains contraband, it is "normally the case" that owners cannot be detained).
Judge Wilkey has argued that because such situations might arise, a warrant should not be required, because if the warrant is refused for lack of probable cause, the arresting officer might be open to a "constitutional tort action" for unlawfully detaining the container's owner. Id. at 1199. Putting aside the issue of whether such a distant possibility, see note 40 supra (damages actions against police unlikely to succeed), should justify a sacrifice of Fourth Amendment privacy protection, Judge Wilkey's criticism proves too much. For if an officer were not required to obtain a warrant in such circumstances and instead searched the container on the spot, he would still be open to a hypothetical "constitutional tort action" on grounds of "unlawful search," if he had no probable cause for his action. Foregoing the warrant requirement for containers, then, will still fail to protect officers from the litigious, innocent victims of their excesses.
129. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) ; accord Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979) . Privacy or unusual privacy interests and the absence of any privacy interest must be clearly drawn: the latter receive no Fourth Amendment cognizance but the former should be firmly and fully protected. Likewise, containers such as gun or violin cases, that only suggest but do not reveal their contents, should be held to implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. The identity of the contents of such outwardly suggestive containers will remain uncertain unless further government action is taken, and this privacy should be protected by the Fourth Amendment to the same extent as it is in the case of other more nondescript containers."' The Supreme Court's suggestion to the contrary appeared only as dictum in a footnote,"' and should properly be rejected." 5 In sum, all containers that are closed and opaque and otherwise preserve privacy should be fully subject to Fourth Amendment privacy analysis.
A bright-line rule mandating full Forth Amendment protection for all closed, opaque containers in non-exigent circumstances provides ease of administration for police, as well as complete protection for privacy interests. First, there is no reason to believe that police department property rooms will be overburdened by a multitude of containers, because officers must now bring back the evidentiary contents of containers that they search in the field. 36 Second, any resultant reduction in suppression litigation surrounding such searches will result in less time spent in such proceedings by officers, and less cost for the criminal justice system as a whole. Third and most importantly, a distinct and understandable rule will reduce officers' confusion on the job. 137 133. Cf. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 Ct. , 2846 Ct. (1981 (plurality opinion) (only container that "clearly reveal[s] its contents" may be searched without warrant) (emphasis supplied). Contra, People v. Green, 115 Cal. App. 3d 259, 261, 171 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (Ct. App. 1981 ) (gun case "by its very nature cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy"). Certainty regarding identity is of paramount importance when the definition of privacy as secrecy is applied; gun and violin cases do not necessarily contain the objects that they suggest. Cf. Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967, 980 (4th Cir. 1981 ) (Russell, J., dissenting) ("[S]omeone might . . . easily place socks, underwear, and a toothbrush in a gun case.") If the hypothetical gun case were securely within the control of the police, it would present no immediate danger to them and a warrant should be sought. If the situation were otherwise, an exigent circumstances rationale, see p. 322 supra, would justify an immediate search.
134. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (suggesting that "some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature" do not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests "because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance"). 136. Presumably, officers now seize and search only those containers for which they have probable cause. Most warrantless container searches in the field should therefore yield criminal or evidentiary items that must be taken back to the department and stored in any event. Under a strict warrant rule it should be the case that only in a few instances will police bring back unopened containers that do not contain criminal items; if such is not the case, then a strict warrant rule will act to discourage a practice of unthinking general searches of containers.
137. 
Conclusion
Protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment has been confused and inconsistent. The law must develop a more objective and sociologically accurate description of privacy if privacy interests are to be preserved to the satisfaction of both citizens and police. Fourth Amendment analysis should be revised to include a more objective definition of privacy as secrecy and solitude when determining the scope of the Amendment, and to exclude warrant costs when applying its protections. Courts should use this approach to develop inclusive, non-discriminatory guidelines for police, so that the Fourth Amendment can be applied effectively yet fairly in the privacy context. trunk search).
143. The Supreme Court evidently has taken a contrary view in its decision in New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 Ct. (1981 . Based on the need for a "workable rule" for automobile searches incident to arrest, the Court held that the warrantless search of a vehicle and any containers within it is permissible whenever the occupants have been lawfully arrested. Id. at 2864. This decision not only eliminates warrant protection for cars and containers in them whenever a lawful arrest is made, but also apparently relieves officers from having to demonstrate that they have probable cause to search at all. Because this bright line is unprotective of the privacy interests in automobiles and removes them completely from the Fourth Amendment's protective scope, it unavoidably conflicts with the analytical framework that this Note proposes.
